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barrassment depends upon the kind of proof required as to acts of the foreign government. The position of the court in the instant case, requiring proof of the particular
governmental acts upon which the foreign government's assertion of title was based
and refusing to adopt the statement of the accredited representative of the foreign
government as conclusive proof of the fact that the foreign government has executed
those acts, may cause serious embarrassment. This approach imposes on the United
States the almost impossible task of determining, before purchasing, what acts took
place in the foreign state and of obtaining sufficient proof of the acts to satisfy a
domestic court. Such an inquiry might affront the foreign government. Moreover,
since acts of a foreign government need not be even "colombly valid,"'7 and since,
therefore, any acts claimed by the foreign government to be sufficient to pass title have
that effect, it would seem that the "acts" themselves become irrelevant. For instance,
where the foreign government's acts take the form of a sectet decree transferring title
to it, proof of governmental acts ultimately depends on statements of government officials. The only effect of the requirement of proof of the particular acts would be to
change the result of a case in which proof of the acts is not possible. If the foreign government is no longer in existence, as was almost the situation in the instant case, it may
be impossible to obtain proof of any "acts" of the government.
It appears to be preferable, then, for courts to accept the statement of the representative of the foreign government as conclusive. An analogy is found in an English case s
in which, when the diplomatic immunity of an alleged member of a foreign mission was
in question, it was held that a statement by the foreign office was conclusive. Even if
this rule were adopted in cases involving purchase by the government, it would not
necessarily be applicable to cases involving purchases by private persons. In the latter
cases, embarrassment to the United States in the conduct of foreign affairs is more remote and can arise only if the foreign government takes offense at the domestic court's
decision and makes diplomatic representations. But even here, judicial interference
violates the foreign government's immunity from suit by compelling it to defend its actions in court 9 and injures the market for its property.2 0
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lective bargaining representative for its employees, refused to sign a written agreement. The National Labor Relations Board, in an unfair labor practice proceeding,
ordered the employer to sign an agreement embodying the terms reached with the
union. On certiorari from the United States Supreme Court to review a judgment of
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upholding the board's order,' held,
that refusal to sign a written agreement constituted a refusal to bargain collectively
and an unfair labor practice under the act,2 and that the board might require a signed
agreement where the union had so requested. Judgment affirmed. H. J. Heinz Co. v.
NLRB.3
The principal case ends the uncertainty resulting from conflicting holdings among
the circuit courts of appeals as to whether the National Labor Relations Act requires
an employer to sign a written contract. 4 The conclusion that the signing of a written
agreement is not required was considered to follow from the fact that the employer
was not obligated by the act to agree, the only requirement being that he bargain in
good faith.s In the principal case the Supreme Court rejected this contention, and
pointed out that it does not follow from the employer's freedom not to agree that he
may refuse to embody his voluntary agreement in writing. The Court found that
written agreements were intended by Congress, inasmuch as they are an essential part
of collective bargaining. In so holding, the Court relied on evidence showing that written trade agreements were the general rule in collective bargaining,6 and that they were
necessary to preserve the collective bargaining right itself.7 It was further found that
Congress intended to incorporate into the act the experience gained in administering
the similar provisions of the Railway Labor Act s and the National Industrial Recovery
Act.9 The National Mediation Board, under the authority of the former of these acts,
had considered written agreements essential to collective bargaining;zo under the
I H. J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 1io F. (2d) 843 (C.C.A. 6th 1940).
2National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq. (Supp. 1940).
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NRA, although refusal to sign was held not necessarily in violation of the law, it was
considered as evidence showing denial of the right of collective bargaining.- This
method of including in the concept of collective bargaining the requirement of written
agreements suggests that other historically well-established aspects of collective bar2
gaining may be similarly insisted upon.'
It might be argued, nevertheless, that this decision does not cover the dissimilar factual situation of Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB,3 where the employer had stated from the
opening of negotiations that he did not intend to sign an agreement. But the distinction between the employer's announcing that he will refuse to sign if an agreement
should be reached, as in the Inland Steel case, and his refusal to sign after agreement
has been reached, as in the principal case, should prove of no significance. In both instances the employer is indicating that he does not intend to fulfill his statutory duties.
Consequently, refusal to sign may well be considered a decisive indication of lack of
good faith by the employer. Several of the decisions are based at least in part on this
ground.'4
It would seem beyond question that written trade agreements are preferable to oral
agreements, if only from the standpoint of good business practice. Employers refusing
to sign have frequently posted bulletins outlining the terms of agreement, but such
announcements seldom mention the union or indicate that the terms were reached
through negotiation. The practice therefore amounts to a failure fully to recognize
the union,'s and its consequences may be loss of union prestige and weakening of union
organization. Since the decision in the principal case prohibits the use of this device,
it is to be expected that some employers will now endeavor to avoid agreements altogether, whether written or not, by relying literally on the ruling that they need only
bargain in good faith.
For this reason it is difficult to assess the importance of the principal case, and much
depends upon the effectiveness of the board's enforcement of the "good faith" requirement. What constitutes good faith in collective bargaining has already been the subject of numerous court and board decisions, but many of these deal with rather flagrant
indications of bad faith. 6 As employers realize the futility of practices considered by

" Lorwin and Wubnig, Labor Relations Boards 3z2 (,935).
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The Duty to Bargain Collectively, 5 Law & Contemp. Prob. 242, 248 (1938). An employer
might be compelled to sign an agreement of longer duration than he desired on the ground
that only an agreement of such duration would be consistent with collective bargaining. The
term of most collective agreements is in fact one year. Yoder, Labor Economics and Labor
Problems 499 (9.33). So far the board has regarded the question of duration as a matter for
negotiation between the parties. NLRB Ann. Rep., at 86 (i937).
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v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., iio F. (2d) 632 (C.C.A. 4th i94o); Wilson & Co. v.
NLRB, 115 F. (2d) 759 (C.C.A. 8th x940); cf. H. J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, iio F. (2d) 843, 849
(C.C.A. 6th i94o). This was the holding of the board in Inland Steel Co., 9 N.L.R.B. 783, 8oz
(1938), rev'd sub nom. Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, IO9 F. (2d) 9 (C.C.A. 7 th 194o).
1sCf. NLRB v. Griswold Mg. Co., io6 F. (2d) 713 (C.C.A. 3 d 1939).
' 6NLRB v. Somerset Shoe Co., iii F. (2d) 68i (C.C.A. ist i94o); Jeffery-De Witt Insulator Co. v. NLRB, 9i F. (2d) 134 (C.C.A. 4 th 1937), cert. den. 302 U.S. 731 (19 37);Lady
Ester Lingerie Corp., io N.L.R.B. 5i8 (1938); Charles J. Stein, i4 N.L.R.B. 667 (1939);
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the courts to be indicative of bad faith, the difficulty of determining good faith will correspondingly increase. "Good faith" does not require that the employer take the initiative,7 but it does demand that he negotiate with a mind open to persuasion 8 and with
the intention of reaching an accord if possible.9 The difficulty of applying this criterion is especially apparent with respect to counterproposals." ° The employer need
not submit counterproposals on his own initiative,2 but if requested he should suggest
terms.22 The nature and the manner of presentation of such terms are central in determining intent.3 Thus, if the employer demonstrates during negotiations that he regards his initial position as his final one, despite repeated union concessions, his compliance with the formalities of bargaining may not suffice.'4
It is possible that the difficulty of enforcing the "good faith" requirements willpermit circumvention of the decision in the principal case. Nevertheless, strong unions
will be able to compel the acceptance of some terms by the employer; it is important
that they now can compel the embodiment of these terms in signed agreements.
cf. The Solvay Process Co., 3 C.C.H. Lab. Law Serv. 6o,2o8 (i94i); NLRB v. Hopwood
Retinning Co., 98 F. (2d) 97 (C.C.A. 2d x938).
'7 NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292 (1939).
is See Globe Cotton Mills v. NLRB, io3 F. (2d) 91, 94 (C.C.A. 5 th 1939); NLRB v. Griswold Mfg. Co., io6 F. (2d) 713, 723 (C.C.A. 3d 1939).
'9 The purpose of the act is to compel collective bargaining to the end that trade agreements
may be made. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 3o5 U.S. 197, 236 (i938); NLRB v.
Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332, 342 (1939).
20 The board has considered the employers' willingness to make counterproposals an important indication of good faith. NLRB Ann. Rep., at 97 (1938); cf. Adams Brothers Manifold Printing Co., 17 N.L.R.B. 974, 980 (I939). The board's position was pointedly criticized
by the committee investigating the labor board (Smith Committee). Final Report of the House
of Representatives Committee to Investigate the NLRB 474-75, 76th Cong. ist Sess. (Bureau
of Nat'l Affairs, Dec. 28, 1940).
21NLRB v. Express Publishing Co., iii F. (2d) 588 (C.C.A. 5th i94o), cert. granted 61
S. Ct. 134 (1940).
"See Globe Cotton Mills v. NLRB, io3 F. (2d) 9I, 9 4 (C.C.A. 5 th r939). Compare Kellogg
Switchboard & Supply Co., i C.C.H. Lab. Law Serv. 6199 (194I) with Easton Publishing
Co., i9 N.L.R.B. No. 43 (i94o). But were counterproposals required of employers in all cases,
the unions, by accepting, could always secure immediate agreements. Ward, The Mechanics
of Collective Bargaining, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 754, 773 (1940).
'2 See NLRB v. Hopwood Retinning Co., 98 F. (2d) 97, 01 (C.C.A. 2d 1938). Rosenfarb,
The National Labor Policy 204 (1940).
'4 See P. Lorillard Co., x6 N.L.R.B. 684 (1939), where the employer's action in repeating
the same counterproposal convinced the board that he was not open to persuasion and was
substituting for collective bargaining a process amounting to unilateral formulation of terms.
The circuit court of appeals thought differently. NLRB v. P. Lorilard Co., 3 C.C.H. Lab.
Law Serv. 60,289 (C.C.A. 6th 194). This case thus serves as an excellent illustration of the
difficulties of determining what constitutes good faith. Cf. NLRB v. Express Publishing Co.,
ir F. (2d) S88, 589 (C.C.A. 5th 194o), cert. granted 61 S. Ct. 134 (1940). See Ward, The
Mechanics of Collective Bargaining, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 754, 772 (1940).
2S "The indicia of good faith are notoriously elusive ....... S. L. Allen & Co., i N.L.R.B.
724, 727 (1936). Nevertheless the board has enforced this requirement in fairly close cases.
See Sigmund Freisinger, io N.L.R.B. 1o43 (1939); Dallas Cartage Co., 14 N.L.R.B. 411 (1939);
Knoxville Publishing Co., 12 N.L.R.B. 1209 (1939).

